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MISASSIGNING INCOME: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND ATTORNEYS' FEES 
Stephen B. Cohen' 
This past term's Supreme Court decision in Commissioner v. 
Banks and Commissioner v. Banaitis distorts foundational principles, 
known as assignment of income law, which help identify the person 
who must report income for federal tax purposes. The Court holds that 
assignment of income principles require a plaintiff to report as income 
the portion of a recovery paid to the plaintiffs attorney as a contingent 
fee. As a result, the plaintiff is taxed at excessively high rates, which 
may in some cases equal or exceed a confiscatory 100%. Taxing the 
plaintiff on the attorney-fee portion of a recovery also undermines the 
objective of federal fee-shifting statutes, which is to enable a prevailing 
plaintiff to act as a private attorney general by employing an attorney 
without cost. Although recent legislation changes the result in the future 
for specified categories of litigation, including a wide variety of civil 
rights and employment claims, there remain significant classes of cases, 
including nonphysical torts, physical torts with punitive damages, and 
environmental statutes with fee-shifting provisions, to which this recent 
legislation does not apply and in which plaintiffs will continue to be 
taxed unfairly under the Court's decision . 
• Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Charles Davenport, 
Stephen Glass, Daniel Halperin, Albert Lauber, Laura Sager, Deborah Schenk, 
Nancy Staudt, and Ethan Yale provided insightful comments on and criticisms of an 
earlier draft. Anne Sias provided invaluable research assistance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over thirty years have passed since the Supreme Court last 
considered foundational principles, known as assignment of income 
law, which help identify the person who must report income for 
federal tax purposes.1 Tax lawyers therefore expectantly awaited the 
1 See generally 4 BORIS I. BITIKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION 
OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 'lI 75.1 (3d ed. 1999). The Supreme Court last 
considered assignment of income law principles in United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441 
(1973) (applying assignment of income principles to hold that payments for services 
deflected to a retirement fund were presently taxable to individual partners of a 
partnership). In the three decades since the Basye decision, the Court typically has 
decided only a handful of tax cases each term. Moreover, those cases have usually 
concerned technical interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) rather than 
foundational principles. See, e.g., Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 531 U.S. 206 (2001) 
(referring to the plain language of I.R.C. § 108 to resolve a conflict over the 
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Supreme Court's decision this past term in Commissioner v. Banki 
and Commissioner v. Banaitis,3 which applies these principles to 
contingent attorneys' fees. 
Unfortunately, the Court's decision, which requires a plaintiff to 
report as income the portion of a recovery paid to the plaintiff's 
attorney as a contingent fee,4 distorts assignment of income principles 
by treating the recovery as the product solely of the plaintiff's claim 
rather than the product jointly of the plaintiff's claim and the 
attorney's labor. The Court also fails to provide convincing reasons 
for refusing to apportion the recovery between the plaintiff and the 
attorney according to their proportionate shares so that the plaintiff is 
not taxed on the entire recovery, including the contingent fee. As a 
result, the plaintiff is taxed at excessively high rates, which may in 
some cases equal or exceed a confiscatory 100%.5 
In addition, the Court unreasonably declines to consider the 
conflict between its holding and the fee-shifting provisions of federal 
statutes, under which the defendant must pay the attorneys' fees of a 
prevailing plaintife These fee-shifting provisions enable the plaintiff 
who cannot pay an attorney to act as a "private attorney general,,7 
sequencing of pass-through and attribute reduction); United Dominion Indus., Inc. v. 
United States, 532 U.S. 822 (2001) (holding that in calculating consolidated product 
liability loss, a "single-entity" approach should be utilized, as opposed to a "separate-
member" approach). 
2 Commissioner v. Banks, 125 S. Ct. 826 (2005). 
3 [d. The Supreme Court's order granting certiorari consolidated the two cases 
for oral argument and decision. 541 U.S. 958 (2004). 
4 Banks, 125 S. Ct. at 829. 
5 The decision was unanimous, except for Justice Rehnquist who did not 
participate. [d. at 826. 
6 See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.c. § 1988 
(2000) (providing for fee shifting in § 1988(b)); Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 204, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (2000) (providing for fee shifting in § 2000a-3(b»; Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 § 706, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5 (2000) (providing for fee shifting in § 2000e-5(k)); 
Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.c. § 3601 et seq. (2000) (providing for fee shifting in 
§ 3612 (p»; Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.c. § 12101 et seq. (2000) 
(providing for fee shifting in § 12205). The Supreme Court has interpreted these 
statutes, which state that the court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the 
"prevailing party," as requiring an award of fees to a prevailing plaintiff, unless 
special circumstances would make an award unjust. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 
U.S. 424, 429 (1983); N.Y. Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 68 (1980); 
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-D3 (1968). 
7 See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894 n.10 (1984); Christiansburg Garment 
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vindicating national policy. Taxing the plaintiff on the attorney-fee 
portion of a recovery, however, eviscerates the objective of the fee-
shifting statutes, which is to enable plaintiffs "to employ ... lawyers 
without cost to themselves if they prevail.,,8 
If the attorneys' fees had been fully deductible by the plaintiffs, 
these cases would never have arisen.9 For the tax years in question, 
however, the Internal Revenue Code (Code) restricted deduction of 
the attorneys' fees incurred by the plaintiffs in Banks and Banaitis.1o 
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (Jobs Act), enacted after the 
Court had granted certiorari in these cases, makes attorneys' fees fully 
deductible in the future for specified categories of litigation, including 
a wide variety of civil rights and employment cases.ll Nevertheless, 
Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416 (1978); Newman, 390 U.S. at 402. 
8 Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82,86 (1990). 
9 Banks, 125 S. Ct. at 830-31. 
10 [d. The attorneys' fees were classified as miscellaneous itemized deductions, 
for which the deduction is limited under the regular tax and not available at all under 
the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). See 1.R.c. §§ 56(b)(1)(A)(i), 67(b), 68(a). 
11 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418. 
Section 703 of the Jobs Act amended the Code by adding sections 62(a)(19) and 
62(e). [d. at 1546--47. Section 62(a)(19) applies to attorneys' fees "in connection with 
any action involving a claim of unlawful discrimination (as defined in subsection (e» 
or a claim of a violation of [31 U.S.c. § 3721 et seq.] or a claim made under section 
1862(b)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.c. 1395y(b)(3)(A»." [d. Section 
62(e) further defines "unlawful discrimination" to mean, 
an act that is unlawful under any of the following: 
(1) Section 302 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (2 U.S.c. 1202). 
(2) Section 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, or 207 of the Congressional 
Accountability Act of 1995 (2 U.S.c. 1311, 1312, 1313, 1314, 1315, 
1316, or 1317). 
(3) The National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.c. 151 et seq.). 
(4) The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.c. 201 et seq.). 
(5) Section 4 or 15 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
(29 U.S.c. 623 or 633a). 
(6) Section 501 or 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.c. 791 or 
794). 
(7) Section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(29 U.S.c. 1140). 
(8) Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.c. 1681 et 
seq.). 
(9) The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (29 U.S.C. 2001 et 
seq.). 
(10) The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (29 U.S.c. 
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because the Jobs Act applies only prospectively, it provided no relief 
for Mr. Banks and Mr. Banaitis.12 More importantly, the Jobs Act 
does not apply to significant classes of cases, including nonphysical 
torts such as defamation,13 physical torts in which punitive damages 
are awarded,14 and environmental statutes with fee-shifting 
2102 et seq.). 
(11) Section 105 of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (29 U.S.c. 
2615). 
(12) Chapter 43 of title 38, United States Code (relating to employment 
and reemployment rights of members of the uniformed services). 
(13) Section 1977, 1979, or 1980 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.c. 1981, 
1983, or 1985). 
(14) Section 703, 704, or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.c. 
2000e-2, 2000e-3, or 2000e-16). 
(15) Section 804, 805, 806, 808, or 818 of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.c. 
3604,3605, 3606, 3608, or 3617). 
(16) Section 102, 202, 302, or 503 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990 (42 U.S.c. 12112, 12132, 12182, or 12203). 
(17) Any provision of Federal law (popularly known as whistleblower 
protection provisions) prohibiting the discharge of an employee, the 
discrimination against an employee, or any other form of retaliation or 
reprisal against an employee for asserting rights or taking other 
actions permitted under Federal law. 
(18) Any provision of Federal, State, or local law, or common law claims 
permitted under Federal, State, or local law-
(i) providing for the enforcement of civil rights, or 
(ii) regulating any aspect of the employment relationship, including 
claims for wages, compensation, or benefits, or prohibiting the 
discharge of an employee, the discrimination against an employee, 
or any other form of retaliation or reprisal against an employee for 
asserting rights or taking other actions permitted by law. 
Id. at 1547. 
12 The Jobs Act states that the new provision "shall apply to fees and costs paid 
after the date of the enactment of this Act with respect to any judgment or settlement 
occurring after such date." !d. at 1548. The date of enactment was October 22, 2004, 
while the settlements in Banks occurred on May 30, 1990 and October 26, 1995, 
respectively. Id. at 1418; Commissioner v. Banks, Nos. 03-892, 03-907, 2004 WL 
1562987 at *23, *108 (June 14,2004) (joint appendix to filings for writ of certiorari in 
U.S. Supreme Court). 
13 See generally Robert W. Wood, Supreme Court Attorney Fees Decision Leaves 
Much Unresolved, 106 TAX NOTES 792, 795 (Feb. 14,2005). 
14 If litigation involves a claim for physical injury, then the compensatory 
damages, including any portion paid as an attorney's fee, are excluded from income 
under section 104(a)(2). However, section 104(a)(2) does not apply to punitive 
damages. Therefore, under Banks a plaintiff must report as income any and all 
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provisions.15 In these cases, the Court's holding in Banks and Banaitis 
will continue to cause the taxation of plaintiffs at excessively high 
rates and will undermine fee-shifting provisions of federal law. 
This article discusses how and why the Court went wrong, noting 
not only the Court's written opinion but also issues raised during oral 
argument and in the briefs that are not mentioned in the opinion but 
may have affected the outcome. Part II details the background of 
Banks and Banaitis. Part III describes the evolution of foundational 
principles of assignment of income law and explains why these 
principles do not support the Court's decision. Part IV criticizes the 
reasons given by the Court for refusing to apportion the income 
between the plaintiff and lawyer as joint producers of the recovery. 
Part V shows that the Court's decision to disregard the conflict 
between the federal income tax and fee-shifting statutes is based on an 
untenable distinction between judgments and settlements that 
undermines the objective of fee-shifting and is inconsistent with 
settled tax law principles and practices. Readers who are already 
familiar with the background of the litigation and the evolution of 
foundational principles of assignment of income law may wish to skip 
directly from this Introduction to Part III, Section B. 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE LITIGATION 
Banks and Banaitis involved plaintiffs who settled claims against 
their employers for unlawful termination of employment and who 
paid their attorneys a contingent fee. John W. Banks sued his former 
employer, the California Department of Education, for employment 
discrimination under federal civil rights statutes and the civil rights 
provisions of the California Code.16 The employer paid Mr. Banks 
punitive damages arising under a claim for physical injury, including the portion of 
such damages paid as an attorney's fee. 
IS Since amending the Clean Air Act in 1970 to include a citizen suit provision, 
Congress has provided for fee-shifting in most major federal environmental 
legislation. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 u.s.c. § 7401 et seq. (2000) (providing for fee-
shifting in section 7604(d)); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.c. § 1251 et 
seq. (2000) (providing for fee-shifting in section 1365(d»; Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.c. § 6901 et seq. (2000) (providing for fee-shifting in 
section 6972(e»; Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (2000) (providing for fee-shifting in 
section 9659(f». 
16 Mr. Banks filed federal claims under 42 U.S.c. §§ 1981 and 1983 and Title VII 
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$464,000 to settle the litigation.17 Mr. Banks in turn paid $150,000 of 
this settlement amount to his attorneys pursuant to a contingent-fee 
18 
agreement. 
Sigitas J. Banaitis sued his former employer, the Bank of 
California, under Oregon state law, alleging willful interference with 
his employment contract.19 The parties settled the case for a total of 
$8,728,559, of which the employer paid $4,864,547 directly to Mr. 
Banaitis and $3,864,012 directly to the attorneys representing Mr. 
Banaitis.20 The contingent-fee agreement between Mr. Banaitis and 
his attorneys determined the division of the settlement payments 
h 21 between tern. 
The issue in both cases was the same: whether the plaintiff's 
income includes the amount of the recovery paid to his attorneys as a 
contingent fee. 22 The Supreme Court granted certiorari at the request 
of the Solicitor General to resolve a conflict among the Courts of 
Appeals.23 The Court decided for the government, holding that "the 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e. Commissioner v. Banks, 
125 S. Ct. 826, 829 (2005). He also filed state claims under section 12965 of the 
California Code. [d. 
11 [d. 
18 [d. 
19 [d. at 830. 
20 [d. 
21 [d. 
22 [d. at 828. 
23 See Commissioner v. Banks, 541 U.S. 958 (2004); Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, Banks, 125 S. Ct. 826 (2005) (No. 03-892), 2003 WL 23010681 at *7-8 (for 
certiorari of Commissioner v. Banks, 345 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2003)); Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari, Banks, 125 S. Ct. 826 (No. 03-907), 2003 WL 23055055 at *10 (for 
certiorari of Banaitis v. Commissioner, 340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003)). Three circuits 
had held that such amounts are not income to the plaintiff. Banks, 345 F.3d at 382-
86; Foster v. United States, 249 F.3d 1275, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2001); Srivastava v. 
Commissioner, 220 F.3d 353, 362--{55 (5th Cir. 2000). Conversely, three circuits had 
held that such amounts are income to the plaintiff. Campbell v. Commissioner, 274 
F.3d 1312, 1313-14 (10th Cir. 2001); Young v. Commissioner, 240 F.3d 369, 376-79 
(4th Cir. 2001); O'Brien v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 707,712 (1962), affd per curiam, 
319 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1963). One circuit had held that whether such amounts are 
income or not depends on the nature of the interest in the plaintiff's cause of action 
(if any) granted to the plaintiff's attorney under state law. Banaitis, 340 F.3d at 108l. 
Three circuits had held that such amounts are income without making clear whether 
their decisions depended on the nature of the interest in the plaintiff's cause of action 
granted to the plaintiff's attorney under state law. Raymond v. United States, 355 
F.3d 107, 113-17 (2d Cir. 2004); Kenseth v. Commissioner, 259 F.3d 881, 883-84 (7th 
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litigant's income includes the portion of the recovery paid to the 
attorney as a contingent fee. ,,24 
Even if the attorney-fee portion of the settlement is income to the 
plaintiffs, these cases would not have arisen if the attorneys' fees had 
been fully deductible by the plaintiffs.25 In that event, inclusion of the 
contingent-fee amount would have been offset by deduction of the 
same amount. Because of the offsetting inclusion and deduction of 
the same item, the amount of the plaintiffs' taxable income (that is, 
net income subject to taxation) would not have increased, nor would 
their tax liability. 
The Code, however, limits or denies the deduction of so-called 
"miscellaneous itemized deductions,,,26 a category interpreted to 
include the attorneys' fees of the plaintiffs in Banks and Banaitis.27 
Under the regular tax, miscellaneous itemized deductions are 
available only to the extent that they exceed 2% of the taxpayer's 
adjusted gross income,28 and even deduction of that excess amount 
may be phased out if the taxpayer's adjusted gross income exceeds a 
certain amount.29 Most important, miscellaneous itemized deductions 
are not deductible at all under the Alternative Minimum Tax 
(AMT),30 to which both Mr. Banks and Mr. Banaitis were subject.31 
There is general agreement that Congress never contemplated 
that the miscellaneous itemized deduction category might encompass 
the attorneys' fees of individuals like Mr. Banks and Mr. Banaitis.32 
Congress intended the category to include expenses that have 
Cir. 2001); Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1454-55 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
24 Banks, 125 S. Ct. at 829. 
25 !d. at 830-3l. 
26 Expenses that are not deductible in computing adjusted gross income under 
section 62 are "itemized deductions." 1.R.e. § 63(d). Itemized deductions are 
classified as "miscellaneous itemized deductions" unless specially exempted, and the 
attorneys' fees in these cases are not among the exempted items. I.R.C. § 67(b). 
27 Banks, 125 S. Ct. at 830. For the tax years in question, the attorneys' fees in 
Banks and Banaitis were treated as not deductible in computing adjusted gross 
income under section 62, and as a result, they were classified as "miscellaneous 
itemized deductions." 1.R.e. §§ 63(d), 67(b). 
28 1.R.e. § 67(a). 
29 1.R.e. § 68. 
30 IRe. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i). 
31 Banks, 125 S. Ct. at 830. 
32 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Gideon, An Interesting Time to Be a Tax Lawyer, 107 
TAX NOTES 779, 780 (May 9, 2005). 
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"characteristics of voluntary personal consumption expenditures.,,33 
Nevertheless, miscellaneous itemized deductions were defined in such 
general terms that the attorneys' fees in Banks and Banaitis, although 
lacking any personal consumption element whatsoever, appear to 
have been inadvertently swept in with other items that Congress 
clearly intended to count as miscellaneous itemized deductions. 
There is also consensus that the result of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Banks and Banaitis is manifestly unfair.34 The plaintiffs are 
taxed under the AMT on the entire recovery, including the attorneys' 
fees. The overstatement of the plaintiffs' income leads to taxation at 
excessively high rates. Although the highest marginal tax rate under 
the AMT is 28%,35 Mr. Banks appears to be taxed on his actual share 
of the settlement at an effective rate in excess of 40%,36 and Mr. 
33 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION 
OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 78 (Joint Comm. Print 1987). The quoted 
passage explains the justification for section 67(a), which limits the deduction under 
the regular tax for miscellaneous itemized deductions. Neither the Joint Committee 
on Taxation nor the House and Senate reports explained the justification for 
section 56(b)(1)(A)(i), which disallows a deduction entirely under the AMT for such 
expenses. Id. at 7&-79; H.R. REP. No. 99-841, pt. 2, at 259-60 (1986); S. REP. No. 99-
313, at 535 (1986). It is, however, reasonable to assume that the justification for 
section 67(a) applies to section 56(b )(1 )(A)(i) as well, since both provisions were 
enacted at the same time as part of the same legislation. Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2114, 2323-24. 
34 See, e.g., Banks v. Commissioner, 345 F.3d 373, 385 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(application of the assignment of income doctrine to attorneys' fees results in double 
taxation); Sinyard v. Commissioner, 268 F.3d 756, 762-63 (9th Cir. 2001) (McKeown, 
J., dissenting) (application of the assignment of income doctrine to attorneys' fees 
could leave a victorious civil rights plaintiff with a net after-tax loss). The National 
Taxpayer Advocate, an independent office established by Congress within the 
Internal Revenue Service (Service), has listed the unfair treatment of attorneys' fees 
as one of six major problem areas in the federal income tax. NAT'L TAXPAYER 
ADVOCATE, FY 2002 ANNUAL REpORT TO CONGRESS, 156, 160-62 (2002). 
35 1.R.c. § 55(b )(l)(A)(i)(II). 
36 Assuming that Mr. Banks is married and has no other income or deductions, 
his AMT income is the full $464,000 settlement amount since any exemptions are 
phased out. Banks, 125 S. Ct. at 829; 1.R.c. § 55(d)(1)(B), (d)(3)(B). The first 
$175,000 of AMT income above the exemption amount is taxed at a rate of 26%, and 
any additional AMT income is taxed at a rate of 28%. 1.R.c. § 55(b)(1)(A)(i). The 
tax due on the first $175,000 of AMT income is $45,500. The tax due on the $289,000 
of additional AMT income is $80,920, and the total tax due under the AMT is 
$126,420. The effective tax rate on the plaintiff's share ($314,000) is consequently 
over 40%. Banks, 125 S. Ct. at 829. 
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Banaitis appears to be taxed at an effective rate in excess of 50%.37 
The plaintiff's effective tax rate depends on the ratio of the 
attorneys' fees to the total recovery. As the ratio increases, so does 
the plaintiff's effective tax rate.38 The ratio is 32% in Banki9 and 44% 
in Banaitis,40 but in cases involving fee-shifting statutes, the ratio of 
attorneys' fees to the total recovery may be much higher.41 If the ratio 
is 72%, the Court's decision permits a confiscatory tax at an effective 
rate of nearly 100%.42 If the ratio exceeds 72%, which is not only 
possible in fee-shifting cases but also likely whenever the primary 
31 Assuming that Mr. Banaitis is married and has no other income or deductions, 
his AMT income is the entire $8,728,559 settlement amount since any exemptions are 
phased out. Banks, 125 S. Ct. at 830; 1.R.c. § 55(d)(1)(B), (d)(3)(B). The first 
$175,000 of AMT income above the exemption amount is taxed at a rate of 26%, and 
any additional AMT income is taxed at a rate of 28%. I.R.C. § 55(b)(1)(A)(i). The 
tax due on the first $175,000 of AMT income is $45,500. The tax due on the 
additional $8,553,559 of AMT income is $2,394,997, and the total tax due under the 
AMT is $2,440,497. The effective tax rate on the plaintiff's share ($4,864,547) is 
consequently over 50%. Banks, 125 S. Ct. at 830. 
38 Even if the proportion of the recovery going to attorneys' fees increases and 
the plaintiff's share consequently falls, the plaintiff's tax liability under the AMT 
remains constant because the entire attorney-fee portion is includible in the plaintiff's 
AMT income without any off-setting deduction. See supra notes 36 and 37. If the 
plaintiff's tax liability remains constant but the plaintiff's share of the recovery falls, 
then the effective rate of tax on the plaintiff increases. 
39 Mr. Banks paid his attorneys $150,000 of the $464,000 recovered. Banks, 125 
S. Ct. at 829. 
40 Mr. Banaitis paid his attorneys $3,864,012 of the $8,728,559 recovered. Id. at 
830. 
4\ In ordinary contingent-fee litigation, the attorney's fee is a percentage of the 
total recovery. In fee-shifting cases, however, the fee does not come from the 
plaintiff's recovery; rather, responsibility for payment of the fee is shifted to the 
defendant, and the amount is determined by the court in a separate proceeding in 
which the fee is calculated on the basis of what is a reasonable fee given the time and 
effort involved. What constitutes a reasonable fee does not depend on the amount of 
damages. Instead, "a reasonable attorney's fee is properly calculated by multiplying 
the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly 
rate." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,888 (1984); see also City of Riverside v. Rivera, 
477 U.S. 561, 576-79 (1986); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); Quartino 
v. Tiffany & Co., 166 F.3d 422, 426 (2d Cir. 1999). 
42 Assume that the total recovery is $1 million, of which the attorney receives 
$720,000 and the plaintiff receives $280,000. The tax due on the first $175,000 of 
AMT income is $45,500. The tax due on the additional $825,000 of AMT income is 
$231,000. 1.R.c. § 55(b)(1)(A)(i). Thus, under the AMT, the plaintiff's tax liability is 
$276,500, nearly equal to the plaintiff's entire $280,000 share. 
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remedy in a fee-shifting case is injunctive relief, the Court's decision 
may cause the "successful" plaintiff to suffer an after-tax loss. 
Shortly before oral argument in these cases, Congress enacted the 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (Jobs Act), which amended the 
Code to permit plaintiffs to deduct fully the attorneys' fees in 
specified categories of litigation, including a wide variety of civil rights 
and employment cases.43 Because the Jobs Act amendment only has 
prospective effect, however, it did not apply to Mr. Banks and Mr. 
Banaitis.44 Moreover, the new provision effectively moots the Court's 
decision in the future only for the kinds of litigation specified in the 
legislation.45 The new provision therefore does not apply to other 
categories of litigation, including nonphysical torts such as 
defamation, physical torts involving punitive damages, and 
environmental statutes with fee-shifting provisions.46 For these 
categories of cases, the Court's decision in Banks and Banaitis will 
continue to have a harmful impact, causing plaintiffs to be taxed at 
excessively high rates and undermining the objectives of other fee-
shifting provisions. 
III. THE COURT DISTORTS FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES 
A. Foundational Cases 
Between 1930 and 1940, the Supreme Court articulated 
foundational principles known as assignment of income law that help 
determine the person to whom income is taxed.47 Assignment of 
income law originally evolved along two more or less distinct lines: 
one concerned with income from labor and the other with income 
43 Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (codified as amended in 26 U.S.c.). 
Section 703 of the Act amended the Code by adding sections 62(a)(19) and (e). [d. at 
1546--47. 
44 See discussion supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
45 See discussion supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
46 See supra notes 13-15. The nonapplication of the Jobs Act will, of course, not 
pose a problem in the unlikely event that attorneys' fees qualify as fully deductible 
under one of the other categories listed in section 62, such as the trade or business 
expenses of a self-employed taxpayer, the reimbursed trade or business expenses of 
an employee, or the expenses of producing rent or royalty income. I.R.C. § 62(a)(1), 
(a)(2)(A), (a)(4). 
47 See generally BITIKER & LOKKEN, supra note 1, '[ 75.2.1. 
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from property.48 The Court's first encounter with an assignment of 
income question arose in 1930 in the case of Lucas v. Eari,49 which 
involved labor income. Mr. Lucas, who worked as an attorney, made 
a binding assignment by contract to his spouse, a housewife, of one-
half of all his future earnings. The issue was whether the assigned 
labor income should be attributed and taxed to Mr. Lucas, the 
assignor, who earned the assigned income. The Court held that labor 
income is always taxable to the person who earns it, even if the 
income is assigned to another.50 
When Lucas was decided, all taxpayers filed income tax returns as 
individuals and there was no provision for married couples to file 
jointly.51 Today, by filing a joint return, a taxpayer is able to cause 
one-half of his or her income to be taxed to a spouse.52 Thus, the 
availability of joint income tax filing for married couples produces the 
result unsuccessfully sought by Mr. Lucas. Nevertheless, the Lucas 
principle remains critical to preventing tax avoidance by individuals 
with high marginal tax rates, who might otherwise assign their labor 
income to related parties other than a spouse (such as minor children) 
in order to take advantage of the assignees' lower marginal tax rates. 
Even after the institution of joint returns, the Court continued to refer 
to the Lucas principle, that labor income is taxed to the person who 
performs services and earns such income, as "the first principle of 
income taxation,,53 and as "the cornerstone of our graduated income 
tax system. ,,54 The leading treatise on federal income taxation 
describes the continuing influence and importance of Lucas: 
Rarely has a judicial decision shaped an entire area of tax 
practice as conclusively as Lucas v. Earl. It prevents ordinary 
wage earners and salaried employees from assigning portions 
of their earned income to members of their families, and it is 
almost equally effective against similar assignments of self-
employed persons and partners engaged In 
48 Id. at 75-6 to -7. 
49 281 U.S. 111 (1930). 
50 Id. at 114-15. 
n & Congress did not provide for joint filing until 1948. See BITIKER LOKKEN, 
supra note 1, 'II 111.3.2. 
52 I.R.C. § 6013. See generally BIlTKER & LOKKEN, supra note l. 
53 Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 739-40 (1949). 
54 United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 450 (1973). 
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occupations ... such as the practice of law and medicine.55 
During the decade after its decision in Lucas, the Court also 
developed principles for determining the person to whom property 
income should be attributed and taxed.56 The Court had two 
competing objectives to balance: on the one hand, as in Lucas, 
preventing a high marginal rate taxpayer from assigning income for 
tax purposes to a party in a lower tax bracket; on the other hand, 
avoiding the imposition of unreasonable impediments to the free 
transfer of property, as would exist if an assignor of property were 
taxable on the property income even after a bona fide assignment of 
the property to another. 
While adopting the perhaps obvious answer that property income 
should be taxed to the owner, the Court was careful to require that 
ownership be determined on the basis of economic realities rather 
than legal formalities. Thus, for example, in 1930 in Corliss v. 
Bowers,57 the Court held that an individual who transfers property to a 
trust but retains the legal power to revoke the trust is treated as owner 
of the property for tax purposes and is therefore taxed on the 
property income even though he has relinquished formal legal title. 
Similarly, in a landmark 1940 case, Helvering v. Horst,58 the Court 
reiterated the principle that property income is to be taxed to the 
person who controls the property, even if the right to the income is 
assigned to another person. Mr. Horst owned a bond with the right to 
receive periodic interest. Shortly before an interest payment date, he 
transferred to his son the right to receive that period's interest 
payment. The question was whether Mr. Horst should report the 
interest income that was assigned and paid to his son. In holding that 
the interest income should be taxed to Mr. Horst, the Court 
emphasized that he retained control over the property (the bond) that 
was the source of the interest income. Therefore, under the principle 
that the person controlling an asset is taxable on the income produced 
by the asset, Mr. Horst had to treat the interest as his income. 
55 BIlTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 1, at 75-10. 
56 See Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 
331 (1940); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 
(1937); Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930). 
57 281 U.S. 376, 377-78 (1930). 
58 311 U.S. 112, 116-17 (1940). 
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B. The Court Misapplies Lucas and Horst 
In Banks and Banaitis, the Court concludes that the assignment of 
income law principles of Lucas and Horst require a litigant to report 
as income the portion of a settlement paid to an attorney as a 
contingent fee. The issue, the Court states, is: 
[W]hether the assignor retains dominion over the income-
generating asset, because the taxpayer "who owns or controls 
the source of the income, also controls the disposition of that 
which he could have received himself and diverts the payment 
from himself to others as the means of procuring the 
satisfaction of his wants." [citing Horst and Lucas] ... 
In the case of a litigation recovery the income-generating 
asset is the cause of action that derives from the plaintiff's 
legal injury. The plaintiff retains dominion over this asset 
throughout the litigation.59 
It may be helpful to restate the Court's reasoning as a syllogism: 
(1) The income in these cases, consisting of the settlement, 
was the product of an asset, namely the cause of action. 
(2) Income from an asset is taxed to the person who controls 
the asset under the assignment of income principles of 
Lucas and Horst. 
(3) The plaintiff retained control over the asset. 
(4) Therefore, the plaintiff must report all the income from 
the asset under the assignment of income principles of 
Lucas and Horst. 
The Court treats the recovery in each case as entirely the product 
of an asset, the cause of action, and ignores the contribution of 
services made by the plaintiff's attorney. As a matter of economics, 
however, the settlement in these cases is obviously the product of two 
separate factors of production. One factor is labor, consisting of legal 
services, contributed by the plaintiff's attorney. The other factor is an 
asset, consisting of the cause of action, contributed by the plaintiff. 
59 Commissioner v. Banks, 125 S. Ct. 826, 831-32 (2005) (emphasis added). 
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The attorney-fee portion of the settlement compensates the attorney 
for the contribution of his legal services and therefore is the economic 
return to (that is, the amount earned by) the attorney's services. The 
plaintiff's portion of the settlement compensates the plaintiff for the 
contribution of his asset (the cause of action) and therefore is the 
economic return to (that is, the amount earned by) the asset. 
Once the settlement is characterized as the product of two factors, 
with the attorney-fee portion constituting the economic return to the 
attorney's labor and the plaintiff's portion of the settlement 
constituting the economic return to the cause of action, neither Lucas 
nor Horst can justify taxing the attorney-fee portion to the plaintiff. 
Assignment of income principles are irrelevant since the attorney's fee 
is compensation neither for labor provided by the plaintiff in 
connection with the litigation (so that Lucas applies), nor for an asset 
provided by the plaintiff in connection with the litigation (so that 
Horst applies). If the Court's holding - that the attorney's fee is 
income to the plaintiff - is to be justified, it must be under some 
other theory. 
The following examples may help distinguish instances in which 
assignment of income principles do apply to contingent fees from 
cases like Banks and Banaitis and in which the assignment of income 
principles of Lucas and Horst are irrelevant. 
Example #1 - A contingent-fee agreement provides that the 
attorney, who is the plaintiff's child, will receive 70% of any 
recovery. If the contingent-fee agreement was negotiated 
between two unrelated parties dealing at arms' length, it 
would provide for the attorney to receive only 40% of any 
recovery. Because the parent and child are related parties 
and because the contingent fee exceeds what would be paid 
under an arms' length deal, the fees in excess of 40% of the 
recovery presumably do not represent compensation for the 
services of the attorney and are income attributable to the 
cause of action, which is the property of the plaintiff. 
Therefore, the plaintiff must report the excess fees as income 
from the asset. 
Example #2 - A plaintiff signs an agreement assigning 20% 
of any recovery to a hospital to which the plaintiff owes a 
debt for medical care. Because the hospital has not 
contributed property or services to the conduct of the 
litigation, the amount paid to the hospital cannot represent 
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compensation for either property or labor contributed to the 
litigation activity. The payment to the hospital liquidates a 
debt owed by the plaintiff and presumably represents an 
assignment by the plaintiff of income attributable to the cause 
of action, which is the property of the plaintiff. Therefore, 
the plaintiff must report that amount as income. 
Example #3 - A contingent-fee agreement provides that the 
attorney will receive 40% and that the plaintiff will receive 
60% of any recovery. The attorney and the plaintiff are 
unrelated parties, dealing at arms' length. If there is a 
recovery, the 40% paid to the attorney represents 
compensation for the attorney's labor and the 60% paid to 
the plaintiff represents income attributable to the cause of 
action, which is the property of the plaintiff. Therefore, 
assignment of income principles should not require the 
plaintiff to report the amount paid to the attorney. 
C. Why and How Did the Court Go Wrong? 
Why does the Court insist on characterizing the settlement as the 
product solely of an asset consisting of the cause of action and refuse 
to view the settlement as the product jointly of that asset and the 
personal services of the attorney, particularly when the briefs for the 
respondents forcefully pressed that view?60 
The Solicitor General's Reply Brief made two arguments against 
the characterization of the settlement as the joint product of an asset 
(consisting of the plaintiff's cause of action) and the services of the 
attorney: 
First, respondents ignore the fact that the legal right to 
recover damages arises at the time of the actionable injury, 
not when that right is subsequently reduced to judgment with 
(or without) the assistance of an attorney. Under the law, a 
plaintiff's right to income is complete when an actionable 
injury is suffered, because it is the injury that gives rise to the 
cause of action and provides the measure of the damages 
recovery to which the plaintiff is entitled. To be sure, an 
60 Brief of Respondent Banks at *10, *15, 2004 WL 1876293; Brief of 
Respondent Banaitis at *5-9, 2004 WL 1835368. 
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attorney's services may help enforce that income entitlement, 
but the attorney does not earn the damages award; the 
plaintiff had already "earned" his or her entitlement to that 
award by suffering injury before the attorney even appeared 
on the scene. What the attorney "earns" is merely the right 
to be paid for services rendered. 
Second, the factual premise of respondents' argument-that 
they could not have recovered on their causes of action 
absent the services of their attorneys-is pure speculation. 
Many litigants successfully represent themselves, and there is 
no basis to determine from the record in these cases whether 
respondents could have achieved the same or similar 
recoveries had they represented themselves.61 
431 
The Court does not mention these arguments in its opinion, and it is 
difficult to believe that the Court took either argument seriously. The 
government's first argument is irrelevant. The critical question is not 
when the right to sue arises but rather what factors of production 
produce the recovery. Clearly, there are two factors involved: the 
plaintiff's cause of action and the attorney's services. 
The government's second argument defies belief and common 
sense. As the brief for Mr. Banaitis noted: 
After years of intensive litigation, with repeated motions, 
extensive discovery, a lengthy trial, and two appeals, the 
defendants agreed to settle the case for $8,728,559. It defies 
reality to assert, as the government does, that only 
respondent earned that money. The Commissioner does not 
suggest that the defendants in this case, from the day they 
dismissed respondent in 1987, wanted to pay him more than 
$8 million in back pay and damages, were somehow unable to 
find him for eight years, and then spontaneously produced the 
check in 1995 when they happened to encounter him in an 
Oregon courthouse.... If the attorney representing 
respondent had not invested hundreds or thousands of hours 
of his time working on this case, respondent would have 
. d h· 62 receIve not mg. 
61 Reply Brief of Petitioner at *7,2004 WL 2190372. 
62 Brief of Respondent Banaitis, supra note 60, at *10-11. 
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Moreover, during oral argument, at least Justice Souter indicated that 
he understood the flaw in the government's position that the entire 
recovery had already been earned at the time when the right to sue 
arose: 
JUSTICE SOUTER [addressing the government's attorney]: 
Mr. Salmons, doesn't the plausibility of your argument here 
rest on the assumption that what the-that the cause of action 
at the time the-that the plaintiff made the agreement with 
the lawyer is a cause of action which has the same value as the 
ultimate recovery that the lawyer gets? Whereas, in fact, the 
cause of action at the time of the agreement with the lawyer 
has an inchoate value. The - the value that is actually 
realized is going to depend in part on the - on the skill and-
and the - the gumption of the lawyer .... 
. . . [I]t seems to me that the value realized as opposed to the 
right to sue are two different figures. And I don't see 
realistically how the client has complete control over the 
value realized, which we don't even know until the lawyer has 
done his work and gotten the check.63 
It is possible that the Court may have doubted whether 
characterizing the recovery as a joint product distinguishes Banks and 
Banaitis from Lucas. During oral argument, Justice Ginsburg asked 
why, if the settlements in Banks and Banaitis were joint products (of 
the plaintiff's cause of action and the attorney's services), the earnings 
of the attorney in Lucas were not also the joint product of the 
husband (who worked as an attorney) and his wife (who provided the 
husband with household services). 
MR. CARTY [counsel for Banks]: [I]n Lucas v. Earl, it was 
the assignor who earned the income that was subject to 
disposition. Here -
JUSTICE GINSBURG: I'm not so sure about that because 
why doesn't the theory that-that applies to the lawyer [in 
Banks and Banaitis] equally apply to the wife [in Lucas]? I 
mean, she took care of everything going on at home, and that 
enabled him to go out there and make all that money. So 
63 Transcript of Oral Argument at *18, 2004 WL 2513558. 
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without her services, just like without the lawyer's services -
MR. CARTY: That is an excellent point, Your Honor.64 
433 
Rather than conceding the point, Mr. Carty might have 
distinguished Lucas from Banks and Banaitis. Even if Mrs. Lucas 
contributed to her husband's well-being, she did not contribute either 
assets or services to the activity of the practice of law for which he was 
compensated. The compensation that Mr. Lucas received for his legal 
services is still the economic return to (the amount earned by) his 
labor. Therefore, when he assigned a portion of that compensation to 
his wife, he was assigning income that he would earn. On the other 
hand, in Banks and Banaitis, the portion of the settlement retained by 
the plaintiff is the entire economic return to (that is, the entire amount 
earned by) the asset consisting of the cause of action. The attorney-
fee portion is not earned either by the asset or by services contributed 
by the plaintiff, but by the attorneys who performed litigation 
services, whereas Mr. Lucas actually earned the compensation that he 
sought to assign to his wife. 
The attorneys for Mr. Banks and Mr. Banaitis may also have 
weakened their position by attempting to distinguish Lucas and Horst 
on grounds that are clearly wrong. Briefs for the respondents 
emphasized that in their cases, unlike Lucas and Horst, (1) there was 
no tax avoidance purpose,65 (2) the contingent-fee agreement was an 
arms' length transaction between independent parties who were not 
family members,66 and (3) the contingent-fee agreement conveyed no 
more than a mere expectancy of future income.67 
The Supreme Court had previously declared that the assignment 
of income doctrine could be applied notwithstanding these three 
factors. In Lucas, for example, the Court flatly stated that the 
presence or absence of a tax avoidance motive was irrelevant since it 
was too difficult to ascertain.68 Moreover, Lucas involved a mere 
64 Id. at *52-53. 
65 Brief of Respondent Banks, supra note 60, at *24; Brief of Respondent 
Banaitis, supra note 60, at *23. 
66 Brief of Respondent Banks, supra note 60, at *24; Brief of Respondent 
Banaitis, supra note 60, at *22-23. 
67 Brief of Respondent Banks, supra note 60, at *13; Brief of Respondent 
Banaitis, supra note 60, at *24. 
68 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930). It was in 1901 that Mr. Lucas signed the contract 
providing his wife with the right to one-half of his earnings. In its opinion in Banks 
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expectancy, since the assignment was made two decades before Mr. 
Lucas earned the income in question. In addition, while the 
assignments in both Lucas and Horst were to family members, the 
Court clearly contemplated that the assignment of income doctrine 
could apply to an arms' length assignment to a third party. The 
opinion in Horst, for example, stated that the owner of the bond 
would be taxable on the interest if he assigned it to a grocer in 
satisfaction of a debt for groceries.69 
In its opinion in Banks and Banaitis, the Court explicitly rejects 
the respondents' arguments that either the absence of a tax avoidance 
purpose or the conveyance of a mere expectancy distinguished their 
cases from Lucas and Horst.7o Thus, the respondents may have 
lessened their chances for success by attempting to distinguish Banks 
and Banaitis on invalid grounds. The respondents' clearly incorrect 
arguments may have distracted the Court from focusing on the valid 
distinction: that the income was the joint product of the asset 
contributed by the plaintiff and the services contributed by the 
attorney, whereas in Lucas, the income was entirely earned by Mr. 
Lucas, and in Horst, the interest income was entirely the return on the 
father's bond. 
In rejecting the characterization of the recovery in each case as 
the joint product of the plaintiff's asset and the attorney's services and 
focusing instead on the question of who controlled the cause of action, 
the Court may also be mistakenly responding to a theory articulated 
and Banaitis, the Court assumes that Mr. Lucas could not have had a tax avoidance 
purpose at that time, since the federal income tax only became law in 1913 after 
enactment of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution. During oral argument, 
Justice Scalia pressed the attorney for Mr. Banaitis on this point: 
JUSTICE SCALIA: There was no avoidance motive in the -
MR. JONES: Yes. 
JUSTICE SCALIA:-granddaddy of all cases. The assignment there, 
although it was between family members, had been made before there was 
an income tax. 
MR. JONES: But we must -
JUSTICE SCALIA: The income tax didn't exist. There-there couldn't 
conceivably have been an avoidance motive. So-so our holding could 
hardly be based upon - upon the existence of an avoidance motive. 
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 63, at *35-36. 
69 311 U.S. 112, 117 (1940). 
70 Commissioner v. Banks, 125 S. Ct. 826,831-32 (2005). 
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by the Courts of Appeals in Bank/1 and Banaitis,n which was 
repeated in the briefs for the respondents. Both Courts of Appeals 
construed the contingent-fee agreements as transferring ownership of 
part of the cause of action to the attorney.73 Under this reasoning, for 
example, a contingent-fee agreement guaranteeing the attorney the 
right to one-third of any recovery transfers ownership to the attorney 
of a one-third interest in the asset in question, the cause of action, 
with the plaintiff retaining two-thirds of the asset. Consequently, 
assignment of income principles do not require the plaintiff to report 
the attorney-fee portion of the settlement. That portion, according to 
the Courts of Appeals in Banks and Banaitis, was income earned by 
an asset that the plaintiff no longer owned and which, at the time of 
the settlement, was owned by the plaintiff's attorney. The Supreme 
Court reaches the contrary conclusion that the plaintiff should be 
treated as owning the entire asset consisting of the cause of action 
because "[t]he plaintiff retains dominion over this asset throughout 
the litigation.,,74 Therefore, under the Horst principle - that the 
person who controls an asset is taxed on the asset's income - the 
Court holds that the plaintiff must report the entire recovery, 
including the portion devoted to attorney's fee.75 The Court, however, 
fails to consider that even if the plaintiff effectively retained the entire 
asset, the plaintiff's return on (the amount earned by) the asset 
consisted of the plaintiff's share of the settlement and no more. Thus, 
whether the contingent fee is characterized as the economic return on 
a portion of the asset transferred to the attorneys under the 
contingent-fee agreement (as the Courts of Appeals held in Banks 
and Banaitis) or as the economic return to the attorneys' services, it is 
not the economic return for either the plaintiff's services or an asset 
owned by the plaintiff. 
IV. ATTRIBUTING INCOME FROM JOINT PRODUCTION 
As the preceding section indicates, foundational principles of 
assignment of income law, as articulated in Lucas and Horst, do not 
justify the Supreme Court's holding that "the litigant's income 
71 Banks v. Commissioner, 345 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2003). 
72 Banaitis v. Commissioner, 340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003). 
73 Banks, 345 F.3d at 383-86; Banaitis, 340 F.3d at 1081-83. 
74 Banks, 125 S. Ct. at 832. 
75 Id. at 832-33. 
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includes the portion of the recovery paid to the attorney as a 
contingent fee.,,76 Instead of applying assignment of income law 
principles, the Court should have analyzed the cases of Mr. Banks and 
Mr. Banaitis as involving the question of how income should be 
reported when it is the joint product of assets and/or services 
contributed by two or more parties to a common venture with a view 
to sharing the profits. 
A. Does the Contingent Fee Create a Partnership? 
If joint producers create a partnership to conduct a common 
venture under Subchapter K of the Code, then each joint producer 
will be taxed only on that producer's proportionate share of the 
income.77 Consequently, the brief for Mr. Banaitis argued that the 
contingent-fee agreement should be treated as creating a partnership 
for federal income tax purposes so that Mr. Banaitis would be taxed 
on his share of the recovery but no more.78 In its opinion, however, 
the Court cites the principal-agent character of the attorney-client 
relationship as the reason for not treating the contingent-fee 
arrangement as a partnership: 
We ... reject the suggestion to treat the attorney-client 
relationship as a sort of business partnership or joint venture 
for tax purposes. The relationship between client and 
attorney, regardless of the vanatlons in particular 
compensation agreements or the amount of skill and effort 
the attorney contributes, is a quintessential principal-agent 
relationship. The client may rely on the attorney's expertise 
and special skills to achieve a result the client could not 
achieve alone. That, however, is true of most principal-agent 
relationships .... 
The attorney is an agent who is duty bound to act only in the 
interests of the principal, and so it is appropriate to treat the 
full amount of the recovery as income to the principal.79 
76 Id. at 829. 
77 I.R.C. § 701 et seq. 
78 Brief of Respondent Banaitis, supra note 60, at *5-13. 
79 Banks, 125 S. Ct. at 832-33 (internal citations omitted). After explicitly 
rejecting the respondents' suggestion that the contingent-fee agreement be treated as 
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The opinion does not explain why the nature of the duties owed 
by the attorney to the client under state law should affect whether the 
contingent-fee agreement should be treated as creating a partnership 
for federal tax purposes. The Court simply asserts that such duties 
matter, referring to the fact that the law of every state prohibits a 
lawyer from entering an actual partnership with a client whom the 
lawyer represents.80 The reference to actual partnerships under state 
law nevertheless implies an explanation: since virtually every state law 
prohibits such partnerships, the contingent-fee agreement should not 
be treated as creating a partnership for federal income tax purposes. 
This explanation, however, contradicts long-established law and 
practice. The Court has previously stated that whether a partnership 
exists for purposes of state law does not determine whether a 
partnership exists for purposes of federal taxation.81 As the leading 
treatise on partnership taxation notes: 
Whether a joint enterprise is a partnership at common law or 
under state partnership statutes is not determinative of its 
status for income tax purposes. Therefore, an enterprise may 
be classified as a partnership for tax purposes even though it 
is not, or could not be, a partnership under a state partnership 
statute. Conversely, the fact that a joint enterprise is a 
a partnership, the Court bizarrely claims that it is in fact not deciding the partnership 
issue: 
Respondents and their amici propose other theories to exclude fees from 
income or permit deductibility. These suggestions include: (1) The 
contingent-fee agreement establishes a Subchapter K partnership .... 
These arguments, it appears, are being presented for the first time to this 
Court. We are especially reluctant to entertain novel propositions of law 
with broad implications for the tax system that were not advanced in earlier 
stages of the litigation and not examined by the Courts of Appeals. We 
decline comment on these supplementary theories. 
Id. at 833. 
80 Id. 
8! Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 288 (1946) (holding Michigan law 
cannot determine partnership status for purposes of federal income tax law); see also 
Nichols v. Commissioner, 32 T.e. 1322, 1330 (1959) (acq.) (holding partnership for 
federal income tax purposes existed between physician and his nonphysician wife, 
even though prohibited under state law); Rev. Rul. 77-332, 1977-2 C.B. 484 (holding 
partnership for federal income tax purposes existed between CPA and non-CP As, 
even though prohibited by state law). 
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partnership under state law is not dispositive of its 
classification for federal income tax purposes.82 
A more substantial reason for not treating a contingent-fee 
agreement as creating a partnership for federal tax purposes is that 
the venture would then be subject to the extremely detailed and 
complex rules and requirements of Subchapter K of the Code.83 As 
one commentator has noted, "contingent-fee contracts are quite 
common, and to convert every contingent-fee contract in the economy 
into the equivalent of a tax partnership would be to severely 
complicate common economic arrangements.,,84 
In any event, a decision not to classify the contingent-fee 
agreement as a partnership, for whatever reason, does not by itself 
resolve the question before the Court in these cases. True, a decision 
to classify the agreement as a partnership would have meant that Mr. 
Banks and Mr. Banaitis should report as income only their shares of 
the recovery, exclusive of the contingent fee. The converse, however, 
is not true. A decision not to classify the agreement as a partnership 
still leaves the question before the Court unanswered. Such a decision 
does not tell us whether the plaintiff should report as income the 
contingent-fee portion of the recovery. 
B. Distinctions Among Informal Profit-Sharing Activities 
During oral argument, the Justices made no mention whatsoever 
of the principal-agent character of the attorney-client relationship as 
the reason for not treating the contingent-fee arrangement as a 
partnership.85 The Justices, however, repeatedly suggested that the 
result sought by Mr. Banks and Mr. Banaitis - taxing the plaintiff on 
his share of the recovery but no more - would create arbitrary 
differences among similarly situated taxpayers.86 
Taxpayers often contribute property and/or services to a common 
venture with a view to sharing profits but without creating a 
82 1 WILLIAM S. McKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND 
PARTNERS 3-5 (3d ed. 2005) (emphasis added). 
83 1.R.c. § 701 et seq. 
84 Deborah A. Geier, Some Meandering Thoughts on Plaintiffs and Their 
Attorneys' Fees and Costs, 88 TAX NOTES 531, 539 (July 24, 2000). 
85 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 63. 
86 Id. at *3~32, *36-37. 
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partnership for federal tax purposes.87 Such arrangements can be 
described as informal profit-sharing activities. They are informal 
because the parties are not treated as creating a partnership (or other 
separate entity) for federal tax purposes. They involve profit-sharing 
because the parties pool property and services and agree to share 
profits. Consider three examples of such informal profit-sharing 
activities: 
Example #4 - A, an owner of farmland, and B, a tenant 
farmer, agree that B may grow crops on the land and sell 
them, with 30% of the proceeds going to A and 70% going to 
B. 
Example #5 - C, a plaintiff with a cause of action, and D, an 
attorney, sign a contingent-fee agreement under which D will 
litigate C's cause of action, with two-thirds of any recovery 
going to C, and one-third going to D. 
Example #6 - E, an author, and F, a literary agent, agree 
that F will sell the rights to E's books to a publisher, with 
80% of the proceeds going to E and 20% going to F. 
In Example #4 (landowner and tenant farmer), the Internal 
Revenue Service (Service) takes the position that each profit-sharing 
joint producer reports as income his or her respective share of the 
proceeds. Neither joint producer must report the entire amount of 
the proceeds as income.88 In Examples #5 and #6, however, the 
Service takes the position that the plaintiff and the author respectively 
must report the entire proceeds as income and then deduct payments 
to the attorney and literary agent to the extent permitted.89 
What are the criteria used by the Service to determine how to 
treat these three examples of informal profit-sharing activities? There 
is no Code rule, Treasury regulation, or other official pronouncement 
P!I See generally McKEE ET AL., supra note 82, at 3-24 ("There is, however, a 
wide variety of economic arrangements that are not partnerships, but that involve the 
cooperative commitment of capital and services with a view to making a profit or 
achieving some gainful economic objective."). 
88 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE PUBLICATION 225, FARMER'S TAX GUIDE 78 
(2005). 
89 Brief of Petitioner at *24, 2004 WL 1330104; Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra 
note 61, at *8-9. 
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on point. The statute - the Internal Revenue Code - is entirely 
silent on this question. The Treasury has not issued regulations 
providing guidance. Nor has the Service issued a ruling explaining 
when it is likely to allow each joint producer to report his or her 
contractual share of the proceeds and when it will require one of the 
joint producers to report the entire amount and then deduct payments 
to the other producer to the extent permitted. The Service appears to 
make judgments about how to treat such activities on a purely ad hoc 
basis. 
Much of the time, the decision how to treat such informal profit-
sharing activities will not matter, because even if one party is required 
to report all the proceeds of the joint production activity as income, 
the party will be entitled to fully offsetting deductions for payments 
that compensate other parties for their contributions. Thus, for 
example, assuming that the author in Example #6 is self-employed, he 
will be able to deduct the literary agent's fee without limit because the 
miscellaneous itemized deduction category does not include the 
business expenses of self-employed persons.90 The issue becomes 
important, however, in cases like Banks and Banaitis, in which the 
expense is classified as a miscellaneous itemized deduction so that the 
deduction is limited under the regular tax and not available at all 
under the AMT. 
For this reason, Mr. Banks and Mr. Banaitis argued that they 
should be treated like the landowner in Example #4 rather than like 
the author in Example #6.91 In making this argument, they followed 
Tax Court Judge Renato Beghe, who had earlier argued in an 
emphatic dissent in Kenseth v. Commissioner92 that the plaintiff and 
attorney with a contingent-fee agreement in Example #5 are like the 
landowner and the tenant farmer in Example #4: 
One way to think of the contingent fee agreement ... is to 
analogize it to a cropsharing arrangement. Cropsharing is 
strikingly similar to the contingent fee agreement. The 
attorney is in the position of the tenant farmer, who bears all 
his direct and overhead expenses incurred in earning the 
contingent fee (and the contingent fees under all such 
90 1.R.e. § 62(a)(1). 
91 See generally Brief of Respondent Banks, supra note 60; Brief of Respondent 
Banaitis, supra note 60. 
92 114 T.e. 399 (2000). 
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arrangements to which he is a party with other clients). The 
client is in the position of the landowner ... who bears none 
of the operating expenses, but is responsible for paying the 
carrying charges on his land, such as mortgage interest and 
real estate taxes. These charges are analogous to court costs, 
which the client under a contingent fee agreement is usually 
responsible for, and which the attorney can only advance to 
or on behalf of the client .... 
. . . [C]ropsharing arrangements result in a division of the 
crops and the total gross revenue from their sale in the 
agreed-upon percentages. This income is characterized as 
rental income to the owner or lessee of the land and farm 
income to the tenant-farmer. 
The analogy of contingent fee agreements to cropsharing 
arrangements is suggestive and helpful. It solves the problem 
under the attorney's ethics rule that says the attorney is not 
supposed to acquire an ownership interest in the cause of 
action that is the subject of such an agreement. The client, 
like the owner or lessee of farmland who rents it to the 
tenant-farmer, transfers to the attorney an interest in the 
recovery that is analogous to the tenant-farmer's share of the 
crop generated by his farming activities on the land leased or 
made available to him by the nonactive owner. ... 93 
441 
During oral argument, the Justices incorrectly suggested that the 
position of the respondents would draw arbitrary lines in the 
treatment of informal profit-sharing activities, while the position of 
the government would not. The Justices repeatedly pressed the 
attorneys for Mr. Banks and Mr. Banaitis to defend the arbitrary 
difference in treatment, which a decision for the respondents would 
create, between the contingent-fee plaintiff in Example #5 and the 
author in Example #6.94 The Justices did not mention, however, that 
the government's position would cause an arbitrary difference in 
treatment between the landowner in Example #4 and the contingent-
93 Id. at 454-55 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
94 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 63, at *31-32. When both Justices 
Kennedy and Breyer pushed the attorney for Mr. Banaitis to articulate a principled 
basis for distinguishing between the contingent-fee plaintiff in Example #5 and the 
author in Example #6, the attorney tried to change the subject. Id. at *31-33. 
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fee plaintiff and author in Examples #5 and #6. The Justices thus 
failed to acknowledge that the position of the government, no less 
than the position of the respondents, draws arbitrary lines. 
In fact, under ordinary and usual principles of taxation, the 
landowner, plaintiff, and author in Examples #4, #5, and #6 should all 
be treated the same, with each having to report only his or her share 
of the proceeds as gross income under section 61(a). Under these 
principles, it is either legal entitlement or economic benefit that 
usually triggers income taxation.95 A taxpayer must report amounts to 
which the taxpayer is legally entitled or from which the taxpayer 
benefits economically. Conversely, a taxpayer ordinarily need not 
report as income an amount to which the taxpayer is not legally 
entitled and from which the taxpayer does not benefit economically.96 
In Example #5, by virtue of the contingent-fee agreement, the 
plaintiff is not legally entitled to and does not benefit economically 
from the attorney's share of the proceeds. Therefore, the plaintiff 
should have to report only his or her share of the proceeds as gross 
income under section 61(a) and should not have to report the 
attorney's share. Similarly, the landowner in Example #4 and the 
author in Example #6 are neither legally entitled to nor economically 
benefited from the share of the proceeds going to the farmer and 
agent respectively and therefore should not have to report those 
amounts as gross income under section 61(a).97 
There are, of course, exceptions to these principles, under which a 
taxpayer may have to report income to which the taxpayer is not 
95 See, e.g., N. Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 423-24 (1932) (holding 
that taxpayer should not report income from property in 1916 when taxpayer's right 
to the income was contested and the income was paid to a receiver instead of the 
taxpayer but that taxpayer should report the income in 1917 when a court terminated 
the receivership and the taxpayer became entitled to the income); United States v. 
Drescher, 179 F.2d 863, 865-66 (2d Cir. 1950) (holding that a taxpayer must report as 
gross income the economic benefit of a nontransferable annuity purchased for the 
taxpayer by his employer). 
96 N. Am. Oil Consol., 286 U.S. at 423-24; Drescher, 179 F.2d at 865-66. 
97 It is true that in these examples, each co-producer benefits from the 
contribution of the other co-producer. Nevertheless, the benefit conferred by co-
producers on each other in joint production activities does not and should not 
constitute a separate item of gross income, in addition to each co-producer's 
contractual share. To illustrate, in example #4, the tenant farmer benefits from the 
use of the land, and the landowner benefits from the tenant's labor. Yet neither 
reports such benefit as a separate additional item of income. 
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entitled and from which the taxpayer does not benefit economically. 
In Lucas ,98 for example, despite the lack of entitlement or benefit, the 
husband is taxed because the income is earned by him. In Horst/9 
despite the lack of entitlement or benefit when the interest is paid, the 
father is taxed because the income is earned by property that he 
controls. For reasons explained in Part II above, however, neither of 
those exceptions applies to Examples #4, #5, and #6 (or to the facts of 
Banks or Banaitis). 
C. Contingent Versus Hourly Fees 
Questioning the attorney for Mr. Banaitis during oral argument, 
the Justices also seemed troubled by another distinction - between 
the plaintiff who enters a contingent-fee agreement and the plaintiff 
who pays the attorney an hourly rate. 
JUSTICE STEVENS: Yes, but what if you had the same 
result but-in terms of the sharing of the expense and the 
recovery, but it was computed on an hourly basis rather than 
a percentage basis? Would that produce a different result?l°O 
As the questioning implies, had Mr. Banks or Mr. Banaitis paid 
the attorneys an hourly rate, the portion of the settlement paid to the 
plaintiffs' attorneys would presumably have to be reported as income 
by the plaintiffs. Therefore, the Court was asking, wouldn't the 
position of respondents create a second arbitrary difference between 
plaintiffs paying their attorneys a contingent fee (who would only 
report as income their recovery net of attorneys' fees) and plaintiffs 
paying their attorneys by the hour (who would be obligated to report 
their entire recovery as income)? 
Although a distinction between profit-sharing payments that bear 
the risk of a venture and fixed payments would result, this distinction 
is already embedded in current tax law and practice. Return to 
Example #4 above - if the tenant pays the landowner a fixed rent 
(analogous to the plaintiff paying the attorney by the hour), then the 
tenant presumably must report the entire proceeds of selling the crops 
as income and take a deduction for the rent paid. 
98 281 U.S. 111 (1930). 
99 311 U.S. 112 (1940). 
100 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 63, at *36. 
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An Amicus brief proposed an alternative theory that would have 
permitted a decision for Mr. Banks and Mr. Banaitis while at the same 
time treating alike both contingent-fee and hourly fee plaintiffs.101 
The brief argued that the attorneys' fees should be capitalized, that is, 
treated as the cost of acquiring and disposing of an asset consisting of 
the cause of action.102 In that event, under longstanding provisions of 
the Code, the taxpayer would report as income only the difference 
between the amount realized from the asset (which is the recovery) 
and the asset's cost consisting of the attorneys' fees.103 Whether the 
plaintiff pays a contingent fee or by the hour, the capitalization 
argument treats the payment as a cost of an asset so that the plaintiff 
reports as income only the difference between the total recovery from 
the asset and the asset's cost. During oral argument, the Justices 
repeatedly asked questions regarding the capitalization rationale, 
giving the impression that the Court might adopt this theory as a basis 
for decision.104 The Court's opinion, however, states simply that it was 
not reaching the merits of the capitalization argument since it had not 
been considered by the courts below.105 Of course, had the Court 
adopted the capitalization approach, it could have eliminated any 
differences in the treatment of contingent and hourly fees. 106 
To sum up, the difficulty of drawing principled distinctions (either 
between different kinds of informal profit-sharing activities or 
between payment according to a profit percentage and a fixed rate) 
cannot justify the Court's holding in Banks and Banaitis. Although 
during oral argument, the Justices repeatedly expressed concern that a 
101 Brief for Prof. Charles Davenport as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
2004 WL 1860016. 
102 !d. at *5-10. 
103 1.R.c. §§ 61(a)(3), 1001(a). 
104 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 63, at *12-13, *21-22, *27, *41-42. 
105 Commissioner v. Banks, 125 S. Ct. 826, 833 (2005). 
106 The proposed capitalization treatment of legal fees as the cost of a recovery 
parallels the actual treatment of the manufacturer or merchandiser of inventory under 
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-3(a), in conjunction with the capitalization rule of section 263A. 
The regulation provides that "[i]n a manufacturing [and] merchandising ... business, 
'gross income' means the total sales, less the cost of goods sold .... " Under 
section 263A, the salary and raw material costs of manufacturing or merchandising 
inventory are capitalized as part of the cost of inventory. Thus, the manufacturer or 
merchandiser would include in gross income under section 61(a) only the receipts 
from selling inventory less their cost. I am grateful to Professor Bernard Wolfman for 
suggesting this analogy. 
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decision for the respondents would create arbitrary distinctions, the 
Court's opinion does not mention this problem as a reason for its 
holding. Perhaps, on reflection, the Justices recognized that arbitrary 
lines would persist even if they decided for the government and 
therefore omitted that consideration in their published opinion. 
V. THE RELEVANCE OF FEE-SHIFTING STATUTES 
A. Conflict Between Tax Law and Fee-Shifting Statutes 
Even if the Court's holding - that the plaintiff must report as 
income the portion of a recovery paid as a contingent fee - is correct 
purely as a matter of tax law standing alone, the decision nevertheless 
undermines the fee-shifting provisions of federal statutes, which 
permit a prevailing plaintiff to recover attorneys' fees from the 
defendant. The purpose of the fee-shifting statutes is to enable the 
plaintiff who cannot pay an attorney to act as a "private attorney 
general"l07 vindicating national policy. Therefore, Congress has 
provided for the prevailing plaintiff in specified categories of litigation 
to recover not only damages, but also a reasonable amount to pay for 
h . f ~ t e serVIces 0 an attorney. 
Taxing the plaintiff on the attorney-fee portion of a recovery, 
however, negates the objective of the fee-shifting statutes, which is to 
permit plaintiffs "to employ ... lawyers without cost to themselves if 
they prevail. ,,109 When the damages are modest compared to the 
attorneys' fees, the Court's decision will result in the plaintiff retaining 
little or none of the damages after paying taxes on the gross recovery, 
which includes the attorneys' fees as well as the damages. In some 
cases, the "successful" plaintiff may even suffer a net loss because the 
tax liability will exceed the damages received. 
A New York Times article provides a striking example of such a 
case.
110 The article discusses Spina v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook 
County.111 In Spina, a police officer who sued her employer for sex 
107 Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894 n.10 (1984); Christiansburg Garment Co. v. 
EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416 (1978); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 
(1968). 
108 See supra notes 6 and 15. 
109 Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 86 (1990). 
110 Adam Liptak, Tax Bill Exceeds Award to Officer in Sex Bias Suit, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 11,2002, at 18. 
111 207 F. Supp. 2d 764 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
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discrimination, including sexual harassment, in violation of Title VII 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, was awarded $300,000 in compensatory 
112 $ 113 damages, plus 950,000 for her attorneys' fees. The fee award was 
especially large because of the extraordinary dilatory and 
obstructionist tactics of the defendant.1l4 If the plaintiff must report as 
income the entire $1,250,000 recovery, including the attorneys' fees as 
well as her compensatory damages, her AMT liability will be 
approximately $345,000, or $45,000 more than her compensatory 
d 1~ amage award. 
B. The Spurious Distinction: Settlements Versus Judgments 
During oral argument, several Justices indicated that they were 
well aware of the conflict with fee-shifting statutes,116 and the Court's 
opinion refers to the problem: 
Treating the [attorney] fee award as income to the plaintiff in 
such cases, it is argued, can lead to the perverse result that the 
plaintiff loses money by winning the suit ... [and] would 
undermine the effectiveness of fee-shifting statutes in 
deputizing plaintiffs and their lawyers to act as private 
1117 attorneys genera . 
A neutral observer therefore might reasonably have expected the 
Court to address and attempt to resolve the conflict, particularly since 
Mr. Banks' employment discrimination claim was brought under 
federal and state laws that provide for fee-shifting and the Court had 
previously observed that, when possible, courts should construe a 
112 Id. at 779. 
113 Spina v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook County, No. 98-C-1393, 2002 WL 1770010, 
at *9 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 31, 2002). 
114 Id. at *4. 
115 Assuming that the taxpayer is married and has no other income or deductions, 
her AMT income is the entire $1,250,000 amount. 1.R.c. § 55(d)(1)(B), (d)(3)(B). 
The first $175,000 of AMT income is taxed at a rate of 26%, and any additional AMT 
income is taxed at a rate of 28%. I.R.C. § 55(b)(1)(A)(i). The tax due on the first 
$175,000 of AMT income is $45,500, the tax due on the $1,075,000 of additional AMT 
income is $301,000, and the total tax due under the AMT is $346,500. The net loss to 
the prevailing plaintiff is nearly $46,500. 
116 • Transcnpt of Oral Argument, supra note 63, at *24, *26-28, 2004 WL 2513558. 
117 Commissioner v. Banks, 125 S. Ct. 826, 834 (2005). 
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statute to "foster harmony" with other statutory law.118 Yet the Court 
makes no attempt to harmonize the Code and federal and state 
statutes with fee-shifting provisions, asserting that it need not address 
the conflict because in Banks there was no court-ordered fee award, 
"nor was there any indication ... that the contingent fee paid to 
Banks' attorney was in lieu of statutory fees Banks might otherwise 
have been entitled to recover.,,119 
The Court's statement that there was no indication that the 
contingent fee was in lieu of statutory fees is simply wrong. Mr. 
Banks' complaint recited that one of his claims was for attorneys' fees 
under the fee-shifting provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,120 and 
the settlement agreement recited that Mr. Banks was to receive 
$464,000 in satisfaction of all his claims.121 Thus, the settlement 
necessarily included the settlement value of his claim for attorneys' 
fees as well as the settlement value of his other claims. 
The Court's additional statement that it was unnecessary to 
address the significance of fee-shifting in Mr. Banks' case because 
there had been no court-ordered fee award is inconsistent with settled 
tax law principles and practices. The Service and the courts routinely 
determine the tax treatment of an amount received in settlement of a 
claim by how the amount would have been taxed if received in a 
judgment.122 The leading treatise on the taxation of recoveries states: 
"For federal income tax purposes, it is irrelevant whether proceeds 
are received as a result of settlement or judgment; i.e., there is no 
difference whether litigation (or the threat of litigation) is concluded 
through court adjudication or by agreement of the parties."I23 
For example, a settlement of a claim for lost wages is taxed in the 
118 See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 879 (1994); 
Bhd. of R.R Trainmen v. Chi. River & Ind. RR Co., 353 U.S. 30,40-42 (1957). 
119 Banks, 125 S. Ct. at 834. 
120 Commissioner v. Banks, Nos. 03-892, 03-907, 2004 WL 1562987 at *49-51 
(June 14,2004) Uoint appendix to filings for writ of certiorari in U.S. Supreme Court). 
121 The settlement agreement recited that "[t]he parties desire to compromise 
and settle all claims which are, have been, or could have been asserted by plaintiff 
against defendants" and characterized the settlement payment as "full and complete 
satisfaction" of Mr. Banks' claims. [d. at *23-24. 
122 See Bagley v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 396, 406 (1995), affd, 121 F.3d 393 (8th 
Cir. 1997); Sager Glove Corp. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 1173,1180 (1961), affd, 311 
F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1962); Estate of Longino v. Commissioner, 32 T.e. 904, 905 (1959). 
123 ROBERT W. WOOD, TAXATION OF DAMAGE AWARDS AND SETTLEMENT 
PA YMENTS !j[ 1.2 (3d ed. 2005). 
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same way as a judgment that awards damages for a claim of lost 
wages.124 Similarly, the settlement of a claim for attorneys' fees under 
a fee-shifting statute should be taxed in the same way as a judgment 
that awards the fees under a fee-shifting statute. How else could the 
tax treatment of the settlement possibly be determined other than by 
reference to what would have been the tax treatment of a judgment? 
Amounts received in settlement are in place of what might otherwise 
have been received by way of judgment and should be taxed 
accordingly. Thus, the absence of a court-ordered fee award does not 
justify the Court's decision not to address the conflict with fee-shifting 
statutes. 
C. Should the Writ of Certiorari Have Been Dismissed? 
In a supplementary brief filed a few days before oral argument, 
Mr. Banks and Mr. Banaitis suggested that, in light of the Jobs Act 
amendment to the Code that made attorneys' fees fully deductible in 
the future in all civil rights and employment cases, the Court should 
dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.125 Given the 
Jobs Act, the Court could well have concluded that the issues raised in 
Banks and Banaitis were no longer of such pressing national 
importance and that it would be a waste of judicial resources to hear 
the cases. 
The Court was certainly aware of the legislation, noting that the 
Jobs Act offered an additional reason for not addressing the conflict 
between the tax law and fee-shifting statutes.126 Having proceeded to 
decide the case on the merits, however, it was unprincipled to 
disregard the conflict on the basis of a spurious distinction between 
settlements and judgments and because of legislation resolving the 
issue for future cases. The Court should either have dismissed the 
writ as improvidently granted or should have confronted the conflict 
between the tax law and the fee-shifting provisions of federal statutes. 
124 Hodge v. Commissioner, 64 T.e. 616 (1975). 
125 Joint Supplemental Brief of Respondents, 2004 WL 2407555. 
126 Commissioner v. Banks, 125 S. Ct. 826, 834 (2005) ("Also, the amendment 
added by the American Jobs Creation Act redresses the concern for many, perhaps 
most, claims governed by fee-shifting statutes."). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Court's opinion sustaining the position of the government in 
Banks and Banaitis is poorly reasoned and unpersuasive. Assignment 
of income principles are irrelevant once the settlement is 
characterized as the joint product of the plaintiff's asset and the 
attorneys' services. There is no explanation why the duties owed by 
the attorney to a client under state law preclude taxing the plaintiff on 
his proportionate share of a recovery but no more. The disregard of 
the conflict with fee-shifting provisions of federal statutes depends on 
an untenable distinction between settlements and judgments. 
Additional concerns expressed by the Justices during oral 
argument are equally groundless. There is no merit to the suggestion 
that joint production does not distinguish Banks and Banaitis from 
Lucas. The notion that the plaintiff's position, but not the 
government's, would create arbitrary differences among similarly 
situated taxpayers is also incorrect. 
Although the Jobs Act undoes the damage in the future for 
specified categories of litigation, including a wide array of civil rights 
and employment cases, there remain significant instances, including 
nonphysical torts such as defamation, ordinary tort litigation involving 
punitive damages, environmental statutes with fee-shifting provisions, 
and any judgment or settlement reached before October 22, 2004, to 
which the new law does not apply.127 Under Banks and Banaitis, 
plaintiffs in such cases must report as gross income the contingent-fee 
portion of a recovery. The result will be to overstate the plaintiff's 
actual income, overtax the plaintiff, and undermine the objectives of 
the fee-shifting provisions of federal statutes. 
127 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418. 
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